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DICKINSON LAIW REVIEWV
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND RELATED MATTERS*
By
A. J. WHITE HUTTON**
Section 1 (a) of the Wills Act of 19471 provides as follows:
"Persons Twenty-one or Older. Any person of sound mind twenty-
one years of age or older may by will dispose of all his real and personal
estate subject to payment of debts and charges."
This subsection takes the place of sections 1 and 7 of the 1917 Act 2 with an
editing of language conducing to brevity but not affecting the heretofore sub-
stantive law.8
Section 1 (b) of the Wills Act of 19474 provides as follows:
"Persons in Military Service and Mariners. During any war in which
the United States is engaged, a person of sound mind eighteen years of
age or older and being in the Armed Forces of the United States in active
service at home or abroad, or being a mariner on land or at seia, may by
will dispose of all his real and personal estate subject to payment of debts
and charges, and may thereafter revoke such will whether or not the
United States is engaged in war and whether or not he is still in such
service or is a mariner."
The comment of the Commission 5 is as follows:
"Subsection (b) takes the place of section 5 of the 1917 act which
reads as follows:
'Section 5. Notwithstanding this act, any mariner being at sea,
or any soldier being in actual military service, may dispose of his
movables, wages, and personal estate as he might have done before
the making of this act.'
"Subsection (b) changes the law in the following respects:
1. It permits a person in the armed forces of the United States or
a mariner, in time of war, to dispose of real as well as personal estate if
he is eighteen years of age or older.
2. It invalidates wills made by all persons who have not attained
eighteen years of age.
* Being part of the revised edition of Hutton on Wills, to be published.
** A.B. Gettysburg; A.M. Gettysburg; LL.B. Harvard; LL.D. Gettysburg; Professor of Law,
Dickinson School of Law 1902 - 1951; now Professor Emeritus and Special Lecturer, Dickinson
School of Law; former Member Pennsylvania House of Representatives; Author of Hutton on
Wills in Pennsylvania; Member Pennsylvania and Franklin County Bar Associations.
I Report of Joint State Government Commission, p. 34.
2 20 P.S. 181 et seq.
8 Report of Joint State Government Commission, p. 34.
4 Ibid.
6 Report of Joint State Government Commission, p. 35.
VOL. 58
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND RELATED MATTERS
3. It makes all persons comply with the safeguards of the WillsAct.
4. It recognizes expressly the right to revoke such a will before
attaining the age of 21, whether or not the status giving the privilege has
been retained.
5. It permits mariners and soldiers between eighteen and twenty-
one years of age to have their wills written at home without requiring
them to be in 'actual military service' or 'at sea'.
The term 'active service' as distinguished from 'reserve' service has
a recognized meaning. It is not the equivalent of the words 'actual mili-
tary service' included in section 5 of the 1917 act."
Full Age
Heretofore the law of Pennsylvania specified generally the requirement that
a person competent to make a will had attained the age "of twenty-one years or
upwards". Therefore, it made no difference as to the actual attainments, mental
or otherwise, or how cultured and trained the individual might have been, if he
was not of the age of twenty-one years he was disqualified from making a will,
In short, the age requirement was an arbitrary matter, the legislature having drawn
the line, there could be no deviation from the specification of the statute. In Hen-
ninger's Estate6 Gest, J., pointed out an exception in the matter of the
nuncupation by a soldier nineteen years of age killed in France during the World
War whose oral will was offered for probate before the Register of Wills in
Philadelphia County. The court held that the will as propounded was valid and
therefore properly probative, because it was governed by the common law and
not by the terms of section 5 of the Wills Act of 1917. 7 At common law a will
of personal property by word of mouth made by a male of the age of fourteen
years and upwards was considered valid. The opinion of Judge Gest affords an
illuminating discussion of the particular subject and a complete review of the
authorities in point in England and in this and other states, but does not repre-
sent the law at the present time, as the Wills Act of 1947 makes no provision for
minority nuncupation. 8
Therefore, the present law requires all willmakers to be of the age of twenty-
one years or older except the special class of persons in military service and mari-
ners as specified by section 1 (b) of the Wills Act of 1947. 9 It may be observed
at this point that at the probate of a will it is not a necessary averment in the pe-
tition to state that the testator was of full age, there being a presumption that this
is a fact which of course may be rebutted by evidence to the contrary. On the other
hand, if the will of a minor is probated and it remains uncontested for a period
6 30 D.R. 413 (1921); see also Satar's Est., 275 Pa. 420, 119 A. 478 (1923); Smith's Will,
6 Phila. 104 (1865) ; Linsenbigler v. Gourley, 56 Pa. 166 (1867) ; McNelis' Est., 22 D. & C. 486
(1935); Gromczuski's Est., 19 Erie 478, 51 York 186 (1938).
7 20 P.S. 194; Smith's Est., 308 Pa. 265, 162 A. 214 (1932).
8 Section 3, Report of Joint State Government Commission, p. 37.
9 Report of Joint State Government Commission, p. 34.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEWV
of two years from date of probate, it has been held to be then uncontestable, un-
less probably on some specified charges of fraud perpetrated upon the court.10
Sound Mind
The Wills Act of 1947 like its predecessor, the Act of 1917, prescribes that
the person making a will must have a "sound mind". What is meant by this re-
quirement?'1 In every day language and according to standard dictionaries, the
meaning is a mind that is healthy, not diseased, with faculties complete and in
p'erfect action. But this is not the meaning attached to this phrase by the judges
who, under our system of law and government, are the final arbiters of the mean-
ing of the legislative body.12 In the redundant and flourishing style of the scrive-
ner of the past century, the testator asseverated that he was "of sound disposing
mind and memory." Not that this was a necessary declaration, for, as Drew, J.,
explains in Qlshefski's Estate,13 citing a wealth of authority, 14 where the will
is properly executed, "a presumption of testamentary capacity and lack of
undue influence arises, and the contestants must adduce compelling evidence to
upset the will, since the law favors its validity." Nevertheless, the ancient phrase
is a happy one, for it affords us a clue to the meaning of the statute, according to
the cases. The mind must be disposing and there must be memory, both of which
indicate soundness. If this be true, nothing else matters. According to Kephart,
J., in Lawrence's Estate,15 "Old age, sickness, distress, debility of body,
peculiar beliefs and opinions, incapacity to do business, partial failure of memory,
neither prove nor raise a presumption of incapacity."
In Leech v. Leech,"° Judge King explains the matter as accurately and tersely
as may b'e found in any judicial utterance:
"A disposing mind and memory, in the view of the law, is one in
which the testator is shown to have had at the making and execution of a
last will a full and intelligent consciousness of the nature and effect of
the act he was 'engaged in; a full knowledge of the property he possessed;
an understanding of the disposition he wished to make of it by will, and
of the persons and objects he desired to participate in his bounty."
Upon these succinct specifications hang all the Pennsylvania law as to testa-
m'entary capacity, amply supported by a wealth of excellent illustrative cases.
17
10 Wilson v. Gaston, 92 Pa. 207 (1879); Stout v. Young, 217 Pa. 427, 66 A. 659 (1907);
Fleming's Est., 265 Pa. 399, 109 A. 265 (1919) ; Wall v. Wall, 123 Pa. 545 (1889) ; Moore v.
Moore, 64 Pa. Super. 192 (1916); Culbertson's Est., 301 Pa. 438 (1930).
11 Report of Joint State Government Commission, p. 34.
12 Brennan's Est., 312 Pa. 335, 168 A. 25 (1933) - Pusey's Est., 321 Pa. 248, 184 A. 844 (1936);
Cookson's Est., 325 Pa. 81, 188 A. 904 (1937) ; Weber's Est., 334 Pa. 216, 5 A. 2d 550 (1919).
13 337 Pa. 420, 11 A. 2d 487 (1940).
14 Grubbs v. McDonald, 91 Pa. 266 (1879); Wertheimer's Est., 286 Pa. 155, 133 A. 144 (1926);
Lawrence's Est., 286 Pa. 58, 132 A. 786 (1926); Null's Est., 302 Pa. 64, 153 A. 137 (1930); In
re Ross's Est., 355 Pa. 112, 49 A. 2d 392 (1946), per Jones, J.; Klinger v. Dugacki, 356 Pa.
143, 51 A. 2d 627 (1947), per Stearne, J.
15 286 Pa. 58, 132 A. 786 (1926).
16 10 Phila. 244, affirmed, 21 Pa. 67 (1853).
17 Duncan's Will, 147 Pa. Super. 133, 23 A. 2d 357 (1941) ; Klinger v. Dugacki, 356 Pa. 143,
51 A. 2d 627 (1947), per Stearne, J.; and other cases following in these notes.
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Before discussing the several factors of the test and the cases, it will conduce to
clarity of thought to explain the presumption of testamentary capacity and its ef-
fect upon the procedure of probate.
Burden of Proof
In the early cases there was some confusion of thought in the use of the term
burden of proof and the profession, as well as the courts, owe a debt of gratitude
to the late James Bradley Thayer for his masterly elucidation of this matter.'8
It is pointed out that burden of proof is a phrase used by the courts in a dual
sense and frequently without explanation. The primary meaning of this expression
is the burden of establishing the issue. This burden is always upon a plaintiff or
claimant who represents what might be termed in argumentation and debate as
the affirmative side. In this sense the burden never shifts. However, a secondary
meaning is the burden of coming forward with evidence. In this latter sense the
burden of proof frequently shifts for it is the burden of producing evidence to
dislodge a prima facie case as may be established by the plaintiff by proofs as al-
ready submitted or in reliance upon a presumption which, although not evidence,
has been characterized by our courts as a guidepost indicating whence proof must
come. On the other hand, if the defendant or contestant assumes the burden of
coming forward and dislodging the prima facie case as established by the plaintiff
or proponent and succeeds in doing so, then in turn the burden of coming forward
with evidence will shift again, this time back to the proponent to meet the proofs
as submitted by the defendant or contestant.
In Henes v. McGovern'9 Maxey, J., points out this distinction in the use of
the term and quotes from Lord Justice Bowen in Abrath v. Northeast Ry. Co. 2 0
wherein the matter of onus of proof shifting is most lucidly expounded. Again,
more recently, Maxey, J., in Geho's Estate,21 referring also to Szmahl's
Estate,22 points out when th'e burden of coming forward with proof shifts to the
contestants in a will case, and citing Plott's Estate23 and k-Iile's Estate24
explains that the burden of proof does not shift to the proponents of a will until
the contestants have offered evidence of such probative value in support of their
allegations against the will, that if it stood uncontradicted it would upon an issue
b~ing awarded support a verdict against the will.
Suppose the will of A is offered for probate before the register of wills. There
are no subscribing witnesses, consequently X and Y who are familiar with A's
signature are summoned as witnesses. The propounded will is in the usual form
18 "A Preliminary Treatise on the Law of Evidence" by James Bradley Thayer, late Professor of
Law, Harvard Law School; see also 5 Wigmore on Evidence (2d ed. 1923) 2500; Rebby's Cases-
Law of Succession, 248 note.
19 317 Pa. 302, 176 A. 503 (1935).
20 32 W.R. 50.
21 340 Pa. 412, 17 A. 2d 342 (1941).
22 335 Pa. 89, 6 A. 2d 267 (1939).
23 335 Pa. 81, 5 A. 2d 901 (1939).
24 310 Pa. 541, 166 A. 575 (1933).
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and is signed at the end thereof. As to the will itself the rule of res ipsa loquitur,
that is the thing speaks for itself, applies. All that is necessary, therefore, is to
prove the signature of the alleged testator. X and Y testify that being familiar
with A's signature through various facts as related and having inspected the sig-
nature appended to the alleged will, they are of opinion that this is A's signa-
ture. The paper is offered in evidence and the proponents rest. They have made
out a prima facie case having established three points: (1) A will in testamentary
form; (2) Signed at the end thereof; (3) The presumption of sanity.
Thus the requirements of the Wills Acts of 1917 and 1947 are fulfilled and
the paper is entitled to probate as the will of A.
Suppose the will of A as already indicated is offered for probate and there
are subscribing witnesses thereto whom we call X and Y. The will as before is in
the usual form and is signed at the end thereof and the rule of res ipsa loquitur
applies. When X and Y are called upon to testify, they do so in a broader way
than in the illustration given of a will propounded without subscribing witnesses.
Said Paxton, J., in Egbert v. Egbert:
2 5
"The signature of a subscribing witness to an ordinary instrument
of writing implies nothing more than that the instrument was signed by
the person whose act or deed it purports to be. It is not so in the case of a
subscribing witness to a will. His attestation is an assertion not only that
the will was signed by the testator, but of the further fact that the testator
was of sound mind when he executed it. It is said by Mr. Greenleaf, in his
work on Evidence, Vol. 2, page 691, that 'the attesting witnesses are re-
garded in the law as persons placed around the testator, in order that no
fraud may be practiced upon him in the execution of the will, and to judge
of his capacity.' The condition of mind of a testator, at the time of the
execution of his will, is a part of the res gestae. For this reason it has been
held that the declarations of a deceased subscribing witness to a will, may
be given in evidence to invalidate it: Harden v. Hays, 9 Barr 151. It was,
therefore, 'entirely competent for the defendants, upon the trial of the
issue of devisavit vel non in the court below, to ask John Baltz, a subscrib-
ing witness, upon cross-examination, the question: 'What was the con-
dition of mind of David N. Egbert, the alleged testator, as to soundness
or un-soundness, when he signed the paper,' and it was error in the
learned judge to exclude it."
Thus the prima facie case upon which proponents rest with the offering of
the paper as proved in evidence has been established, by three points: (1) A will
in testamentary form; (2) Signed at the end thereof; (3) The direct testimony
by the subscribing witnesses of the testator's soundness of mind.
Thus also the requirements of the Wills Act are fulfilled and the paper is
entitled to probate as the will of A.
In both instances, however, the prima facie case may be dislodged by the evi-
dence offered by contestants and with the resultant features concerning burden of
proof as already outlined.
25 78 Pa. 326 (1875).
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Concerning the attestation of a will by subscribing witnesses, under the recent
Wills Act of 1917 and its amendments subscribing witnesses were not required,
the same having been eliminated even in the case of a will containing a charitable
gift.26 However, under the Wills Act of 1947 subscribing witnesses are now re-
quired in cases of signatures by mark and signatures by another.27
It may be added that there are distinct advantages in the presence of such wit-
nesses as is provided in the English statutes and in the statutes of many -states in
this country. As indicated in Egbert v. Egbert, supra, these witnesses are profes-
sional and attest not only to the genuineness of the testator's signature but also
to his soundness of mind. Furthermore, there is this further observation as made
in Plott's Estate28 by Barnes, J.:
"As the subscribing witnesses are deemed the 'court's witnesses',
Whitaker's Estate, supra (10 W.N.C. 139), their attendance at the trial
should be required by the court, if necessary, upon the request of pro-
ponent or contestant. When called to testify they may be freely examined
and cross-examined by both parties, without either one being bound by
any adverse testimony given by such witnesses, as would be in the case
of a witness called as if upon cross-examination. The justification for
their presence at the trial of an issue to determine the validity of a will
may be found in the fact that they are competent to prove not merely the
execution of the will, but that the testator was of sound mind at th-e time
it was signed, and they are subject to examination at length upon these
essential questions in cases of this character. Egbert v. Egbert, 78 Pa.
326; McNitt v. Gilliland." 29
Another noteworthy feature is the type of subscribing witnesses as well as
the draftsman of the will, exemplified in Aggas v. Munnell,80 wherein Walling,
J., observed:
"Where the draftsman of the will is an attorney and acquainted with
the testator and his opinion of capacity is supported by the subscribing
witnesses, it makes a case for proponent which requires strong evidence
to overcome. Phillip's Estate, 299 Pa. 415, 149 A. 719; Kustus v. Hager,
et al, 269 Pa. 103, 111, 112 A. 45; Kane's Estate, 206 Pa. 204, 55 A.
917."
It has also been held that every attestation of a signature to a will is direct
evidence by the witness that testatrix was competent to understand and execute
the will.31
Record of Probate
Under our practice the will is probated, an appeal may be taken within the
prescribed period by any parties interested from the decree of the register to the
26 20 P.S. 195 and supplement showing original Sec. 6 Wills Act June 7, 1917, P.L. 403, as
amended by Acts of July 22, 1935, P.L. 573, and May 16, 1939, P.L. 141.
27 Report of Joint State Government Commission, pp. 36-37.
28 See n. 17, supra.
29 246 Pa. 378, 92 A. 508 (1914).
30 302 Pa. 78, 152 A. 840 (1930).
81 See also Keen's Est., 299 Pa. 430, 149 A. 737 (1930).
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Orphans' Court and upon petition of the appellants directed to that court praying
for the granting of an issue to try the question of the testamentary capacity of the
testator, a citation is issued to the parties in interest and named as respondents
who are required within a specified time to make answer to the petition. Later
the court sets a day for a preliminary hearing on the matters as presented in the
pleadings and testimony may be taken to inform the court on the question of the
propriety of granting an issue. In Szmahl's Estate this was the situation
and at the hearing the proponents, upon whom was the duty of going forward,
offered in evidence the probate of the will. This was objected to, but the objection
was overruled, whereupon the proponents rested; contestants, without offering
any evidence, also rested, it being their contention that proponents had not estab-
lished the validity of the will. The court dismissed the petition of contestants and
from this order they appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In affirming
the order of the court below, Stern, J. thus reviewed the cases and the law on this
important question of procedure:
"While apparently there has always been some lack of uniformity
in the courts of first instance throughout the Commonwealth, this court,
in early cases, approved the practice of allowing proponents to offer the
probate as prima facie evidence in appeal proceedings in the orphans'
court. Sholly v. Diller, supra; Davies v. Morris, 17 Pa. 205; see also
Whitaker's Estate, 10 Week. Notes Cas. 139. By the Orphans' Court Act
of June 7, 1917, P.L. 363, section 20 (3) 20 PS Sections 2561, it was
provided that 'On appeal from the decision of any register of wills, . . . the
orphans' court shall hear the testimony de novo, unless all parties ap-
pearing in the proceeding shall agree that the case shall be heard on the
testimony taken before such register: Provided, That, in all cases, the
court shall have power to require the production before it, for exami-
nation, of the witnesses already examined, or of any other witnesses.' Not-
withstanding this enactment it was held in Keen s Estate, 299 Pa. 430,
440, 149 A. 737, that, on appeal from the register's order probating a
will, it is sufficient for the propon'ents in the first instance to offer the
register's record of probate, and thereupon the burden of proof shifts
to the contestants. The court cited with approval the following excerpt
from the opinion of Judge Penrose in Whitaker's Estate, 10 Week. Notes
Cas. 139: 'Until a prima facie case against the will has been made out by
the contestant, they (the proponents) may rest upon the proof before
the register, whose decree admitting the will to probate stands until duly
reversed.' The same question arose again in Plott's Estate, Pa., 5 A. 2d.
901, opinion filed March 22, 1939-this time in connection with the trial
of an issue d.v.n. There the trial judge refused to receive the record of
probate of the register as prima facie evidence of the execution of the
will. The verdict was for th'e contestants, and the decree entered thereon
was affirmed by this court, but it was pointed out in the opinion of Mr.
Justice Barnes that 'The weight of authority both in this state and in other
jurisdictions (is), that the burden of proof in both cases (the initial
hearing in the orphans' court concerning the award of an issue, and also
82 See n. 22, supra.
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thL trial of the issue if granted) is satisfied by the introduction in evi-
dence of the probate record, and the contestants must then offer proof
to overcome the prima facie case thereby established. . . . While it is
true generally that the burden rests upon the proponent at all times to
sustain the will, yet in the first instance he meets that burden by offer-
ing in %vidence the record of probate.' The decree of the lower court was
affirmed only because proponent, instead of standing his ground after the
ruling of the trial judge, proceeded to call the subscribing witnesses in an
attempt to prove the execution of the will, thereby waiving insistence
upon the point which he had raised and eliminating it as a question of
importance."
"We see no reason for repudiating the views expressed in Keen's
Estate and in Plott's Estate, supra."
With the foregoing outline of procedural matters, it is the law that before the
register all that is required in the probate of a will, testamentary in form, is the
proof of execution and upon the probate the proponents have an accomplished
fact. Therefore, on appeal proceedings either in the form of a preliminary hear-
ing or the trial of the issue d.v.n. the proponents as the plaintiffs make out a prima
facie case by offering the record of probate in evidence. The same being admitted,
the proponents should rest and place the burden upon the contestants who are the
defendants to come forward with evidence to dislodge the prima facie case. The
amount of evidence required to dislodge is that amount which would be required
to sustain a verdict against the will. 3 As the rule in civil cases is that of preponder-
ance of evidence and as the burden of establishing the issue is upon the plaintiffs,
the weight of the evidence as presented by the contestants would have to be ap-
proximately 51 % at least, if it is possible in such matters to approximate by mathe-
matical figures.
Disposing Mind and Memory
Recurring to the test of Judge King as to testamentary capacity, it is required
that the person making a will shall have the consciousn'ess and realization of the
act that he is performing, viz., in a word he must have mentality sufficient to know
that he is making a will and that the effect of the instrument as executed will
be to give title at his death to the property designated and to the persons desig-
nated; this is the ultimate meaning of sound disposing mind and memory. In
Daniel v. Daniel34 the scrivener called upon to testify stated that he went to the
bedside of the testator who was in a dying condition and he asked him what he
wanted done, to which the answer of the testator was in Pennsylvania German:
"Der Charles wess"-Charles knows. Charles was a brother substantially inter-
ested in the terms of the will. Later Charles said to the testator: "Now here is the
man whom I have brought to write your will:" Charles then told the testator to
state to the scrivener what he wanted and followed by asking the testator how much
certain persons were to receive, mentioning $2000, $3000, $4000, $5000, and
83 In re Lare's Est., 352 Pa. 323, 42 A. 2d 801 (1945). See also notes 21-24, supra; 50 Dick.
L. Rev. 104 (1946); 51 Dick. L. Rev. 62 (1946).
84 39 Pa. 191 (1861).
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$6000. The testator in these interrogations would always select the last sum men-
tioned. Another witness, a lawyer who had transacted business for the testator,
testified that in his opinion the testator was of a low grade of intelligence, about
the same as an imbecile. Woodward, J., reviewing this and other testimony, agreed
that the judgment on the verdict of the jury against the will should be affirmed.
However, the learned justice pointed out that when a man is spoken of as under-
standing the will he is making, it is never meant that he comprehends the possible
legal effect which lawyers and judges may impute to the words he employs. The
nicest and most difficult questions in law frequently arise upon the construction
of wills. Testamentary capacity does not necessarily include an ability to grapple
such questions. This is apparent in Diehl's Estate35 where, in a homemade
will the testatrix used the expression, "I have given (not bequeathed) $600 or
more, if necessary, to put a good iron fence around the graveyard near the Luth-
eran Church in this place." In all probability, testatrix was not informed as to the
technical meaning of the words that she used, but it was quite clear that she meant
to make a gift to take effect at death and she knew what the act of making a will
signified or, in the language of the test, she had a consciousness and realization of
the import of her act. However, it is important to bear in mind that the law of
Pennsylvania does not require a high order of intelligence in the making of a will
and it has been stated repeatedly by our courts that it requires less capacity to make
a will than to do ordinary business, although in Maryland by statute testamentary
capacity is placed on a par with contractual capacity.
36
In Wilson v. Mitchell3 7 the testator was 100 years of age at the time of the
execution of his will. Much testimony was brought out concerning his physical
debility, loss of memory, the habit of dozing off into sleep frequently on occasions
during the daytime, and filthiness of habits and lack of care of his person. However,
the direct evidence was on the matter of the execution of his will that he main-
tained a very lively interest in the same and directed what should be done and dis-
cussed various details, thus indicating that he realized the import and significance
of his act. Said Trunkey, J.:
"If, from any cause he is so enfeebled in mind as to be incapable
of knowing the property he possesses; of appreciating the effect of any
disposition made by him of it; and of understanding to whom he intends
to bequeath it, he is without the requisite testamentary capacity: Leech v.
Leech, 21 Pa. 67. 'He must have memory. A man in whom this faculty
is totally extinguished cannot be said to possess understanding to any
degree whatever, or for any purpose. But his memory may be very im-
perfect; it may be greatly impaired by age or by disease. He may not be
able at all times to recollect the names, the persons or the families of
those with whom he had been intimately acquainted; may at times ask idle
questions, and repeat those which had before been asked and answered;
and yet his understanding may be sufficiently sound for many of the
85 11 Pa. Super. 293 (1899).
86 Ann. Cases, 1915 A. 362-3; Davis v. Calvert, 5 Gill & J. 209; 25 Am. Dec. 282.
87 io Pa. 495 (1882).
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ordinary transactions of life. He may not have sufficient strength of
memory, and vigor of intellect, to make, and to digest all the parts of a
contract, and yet be competent to direct the distribution of his property
by will. This is a subject which he may possibly have often thought of;
and there is probably no person who has not arranged such a disposition
in his mind before he committed it to writing; more especially, in such a
reduced state of mind and memory, he may be able to recollect and to un-
derstand the disposition of his property which he had made by a former
will, when the same is distinctly read over to him. The question is not so
much what was the degree of memory possessed by the testator as this-
Had he a disposing memory? Was he capable of recollecting the property
he was about to bequeath; the manner of distributing it and the objects
of his bounty? To sum up the whole in the most simple and intelligent
form-Were his mind and memory sufficiently sound to enable him to
know, and to understand, the business in which he was engaged at the
time when he executed the will?' Stevens v. Vancleve, 4 Wash. C. C.
262; Lowe v. Williamson, 1 Green Ch. 82. Neither age, nor sickness,
nor extreme distress or debility of body will affect the capacity to make
a will, if sufficient intelligence remains. The failure of memory is not
sufficient to create the incapacity, unless it be total, or extend to his imme-
diate family or property."
In Minnig's Estate38 testatrix was 80 years of age at the time of the
execution of her will dated March 3, 1927. She died July 9, 1927 leaving her
entire estate to her brother, John Minnig. On ,January 19, 1927 testatrix suffered
a hemorrhage of the brain and was unconscious for five days, during which time
and until March 4, 1927 she was attended by her family physician who did not call
after that because she had recovered to such an 'extent that the doctor did not
think it necessary. Before her lawyer drew the will he consulted the physician
to learn whether she was mentally competent to dispose of her property, and, on
being told she was, he called at her home on March 3, 1927 and conversed with
her concerning the disposition she wished to make of her estate. The will was
then written out in longhand in her presence, read to her, and she signed it by
her mark and it was witnessed by two persons, a man and wife who had been
employed by the testatrix to attend her and look after her affairs during her ill-
ness. The will was probated and thereafter an appeal was taken by certain nieces
and nephews of the decedent who in a petition to the court prayer for the awarding
of an issue on the questions of mental incompetency and undue influence. An
answer was filed denying the averments of the petition and after hearing testimony
the court dismissed the appeal and refused an issue on the ground that the evi-
dence of undue influence and mental incompetency was insufficient to justify a
submission of the questions to a jury or to sustain a verdict against the will. In
reviewing the record and affirming the decree of the court below, Frazer, J.,
observed:
"So far as what took place at the time of the signing of the will is
concerned, there is no contradiction, since contestants called no witness
88 300 Pa. 435, 150 A. 626 (1930).
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who was present at that particular time. The evidence relied on by the con-
testants was to the effect that, after the spell of sickness which began on
January 19, 1927, testatrix was in a weakened physical condition and
scarcely able to help herself and would ask 'all kinds of peculiar ques-
tions'; had a poor memory in regard to her business affairs, and would
even at times fail to recollect her friends and relatives; would repeated-
ly ask the same questions, stating to a witness that she believed she was
losing her mind, although the witness referred to a time a year or more
before the death of testatrix; the same witness also testified that testatrix
said she had made her will and that her brother John Minnig would not
get a cent; as a matter of fact, the will which had been in existence be-
fore the one now in existence excluded her brother, and the statement
was accordingly correct at the time it was made. Taking this evidence as
a whole, there is a total lack of testimony to overcome that of the at-
torney and witnesses to the will and the attending physician to the effect
that at the time the will was executed testatrix was mentally competent
to dispose of her property."
In Cookson's Estates9  an interesting situation was presented which
well illustrates the attitude of our higher courts in maintaining the right of testa-
mentary disposition in a case of old age and physical as well as mental debility.
The testatrix was 82 years of age, and at the time of the execution by mark of a
codicil to her will was extremely ill in a hospital and died four days thereafter.
This was drafted by her business agent and in accordance with her wishes as he
afterwards testified. He was also present at the time of the execution. The attend-
ing physician, together with another person, were the subscribing witnesses. Fol-
lowing the death the will was probated and later an issue was awarded by the
orphans' court to determine decedent's testamentary capacity at the time the codicil
was executed and whether it was procured by undue influence. The jury found
testamentary incapacity and undue influence. Upon appeal Kephart, C. J., review-
ing a large number of the leading cases reversed the judgment of the court below
and ordered a new trial. Although the subscribing witnesses by their affidavits
before the register of wills stated that the testatrix had testamenary capacity to the
best of their knowledge, nevertheless at the trial the doctor testified that the de-
cedent at the time of the execution of the codicil was in a dazed condition and did
not appear to comprehend what she was doing. The other witness testified that
the decedent was in a semi-comatose condition at the time and had to be aroused.
Both testified that the decedent fell back exhausted before completing the execu-
tion. On the other hand the business agent, together with the daughter of the
decedent who was a beneficiary under the will, testified very strongly in favor
of the testamentary capacity of decedent and that at the time of execution she was
rational, wide awake and fully understood what she was doing. The Chief Jus-
tice in referring to the burden which rested upon contestant, 'explained as follows:
"The burden rested upon the contestant, Brown, to prove both un-
due influence and lack of testamentary capacity. The invalidity of a will
for these reasons must be established by the manifest weight of evidence
89 325 Pa. 81, 188 A. 904 (1937).
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and the testimony as a whole must support the verdict. In such an issue
the judge acts as a chancellor and should not permit the finding of a jury
to stand which is contrary to the weight of the evidence. While testatrix
was extremely sick when the codicil was written, no confidential relation-
ship was shown to exist between her and appellant. The fact that pro-
ponent is a daughter does not of itself constitute such confidential re-
lation as would shift the burden of proof. These principles are too well
settled to require further elaboration."
Stating furthermore that the record in the present case was void of any evidence
sufficient to justify a finding of undue influence, the reversal and the awarding
of a new trial were based on the following reasoning:
"The trial court charged with respect to the attending physician's
testimony: 'You should consider the testimony of Dr. Daniel J. Donnelly,
the physician in attendance on Mrs. Cookson, bearing in mind that a phy-
sician who has been in attendance upon a patient for a considerable length
of time is ordinarily best qualified to pass upon the mental capacity of
a testator.' This instruction unduly emphasized the importance of Dr.
Donnelly's testimony as contrasted to that of Mr. Foster, the scrivener
and business agent of decedent for many years. This court has stated on
many occasions that expert medical opinions are of little weight when
based upon insufficient facts or an erroneous conception of testamentary
capacity, and should be entirely disregarded when contrary to estab-
lished facts revealing mental capacity. Furthermore, such opinions are
of very doubtful value where they are purely theoretical in character,
and the physician is ignorant of the actual facts upholding or negativing
the existence of testamentary capacity. In the instant cas'e Dr. Donnelly's
testimony is far less convincing than that of Mr. Foster, assuming both
told the truth. Mr. Foster had been decedent's agent for a long period of
time and was fully conversant with her ability to supervise her busi-
ness affairs. If she was as mentally alert as he testified and actually con-
versed with him in the manner related by him, it is evident that she pos-
sessed testamentary capacity. She not only explained to him her reason
for changing the will, but arranged to have her hospital bills paid, and
inquired as to an interest payment on her property. On the other hand,
Dr. Donnelly saw her for the first time on December 5, 1933. His opin-
ion was based solely on his general observation plus the fact that his phy-
sical examination showed him she was extremely toxic. He admitted he
made no examination to determine her mental capacity. The essence of
his testimony is that the degree of toxicity from which she was suffering
would render her mentally incompetent to understand the meaning of
her act and to whom her property would go. He did not relate any actual
facts definitely establishing this conclusion or evidencing in reality such
mental weakness on her part. He did not see her for more than three
hours before the codicil was executed and admitted he did not know defi-
nitely her mental condition at that time, but stated that in her condition
her mind could not have been clear. It is obvious that his opinion, based
almost solely on her physical condition, could have little weight in face
of the facts testified to by Mr. Foster, if the jury found him to be worthy
of belief. The court's charge unequivocably placed Dr. Donnelly's testi-
mony on a much higher plane than that of Mr. Foster, if not as conclusive
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of the question, and warranted the jury in finding testamentary incapacity
on the basis of his medical opinion, even though they might believe the
scrivener. This was prejudicial error and in itself requires a new trial." 40
Aggas v. Munnell4l is likewise an apt illustration where there was concerned
the will of a Civil War veteran executed several months before the death of the
testator at the age of 87. He sent for a lawyer and there was considerable discus-
sion concerning a will, and eventually the lawyer drew it up and sent the same to
the testator for execution. The testator discovered, however, that the lawyer had
omitted one of his grandchildren and the will was consequently returned for re-
vision. This was accomplished by the lawyer and the will as corrected was re-
turned to the testator who then had witnesses called, and after the will was read
he asked his daughter for a pen and also the date which he inserted, signed the
will and had it properly witnessed. By its terms the daughter with whom the testa-
tor made his home was given 76 % of the estate, and the rest was distributed
among the testator's grandchildren. A caveat was filed against the probate of the
will, the matter was certified to the orphans' court and by it to the court of com-
mon pleas for jury trial. The questions, ofundue influence and testamentary ca-
pacity were embraced in the issue and both questions were submitted to the jury
which found a general verdict for the defendants or contestants, and from the
judgment entered thereon the plaintiff daughter appealed to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. In reversing the judgment and entering a judgment for the plain-
tiff, Walling, J., stated that there was nothing in the record to sustain the con-
tention of undue influence and as to the mental capacity of the testator, the fol-
lowing observations, inter alia were made:
"There was in the instant case no such proof of general insanity as
to cast upon proponent the burden of showing a lucid interval when the
will was executed. See Harden v. Hays, 9 Pa. 151; Tetlow v. Tetlow, 54
Pa. 216, 93 Am. Dec. 691; Hoopes' Est., 174 Pa. 373, 34 A. 603. That
he was sleepy and drowsy on some days and much brighter on others,
indicated nothing abnormal. This is not uncommon in very old people.
As stated by Mr. Justice Trunkey, speaking for the court, in Wilson v.
Mitchell, 101 Pa. 495, 503: 'Dougal (the testator) had lived over one
hundred years before he made the will, and his physical and mental weak-
ness and defective memory were in striking contrast with their strength
40 The following series of cases shows the development of the judicial functions in will cases,
the granting of issues and the role played as chancellor in jury trials not as of common law. Flem-
ing's Est., 265 Pa. 399, 109 A. 265 (1919); Fleming's Est., 280 Pa. 252, 124 A. 419 (1924);
Tetlow's Est., 269 Pa. 486, 112 A. 758 (1921), wherein Moschzisker, C.J., prescribes rules, cf.
with Gross's Est., 278 Pa. 170, 122 A. 267 (1923), where the same writer lays down rules for
issues; Taylor's Est., 316 Pa. 557, 175 A. 540 (1934), per Drew, J.; Kline's Est., 322 Pa. 374,
186 A. 364 (1936), per Kephart, C.J.; DeLaurentil's Est., 323 Pa. 70, 186 A. 359 (1936), per
Stern, J., explaining the judicial function; Geist's Est., 325 Pa. 401, 191 A. 29 (1937); Patti's
Est., 133 Pa. Super, 81, 1 A. 2d 791 (1938) ; Plott's Est., 335 Pa. 81, 5 A. 2d 422 (1939) ; Rosen-
thal's Est., 339 Pa. 488, 15 A. 2d 370 (1940), per Linn, J., reviewing the cases; Porter's Est., 341
Pa. 476, 19 A. 2d 731 (1941); Mohler's Est., 343 Pa. 299, 22 A. 2d 680 (1941); these last two
cases per Maxey, J.; that the issues should not embody mixed questions of law and fact, see
Phillip's Est., 299 Pa. 415, 149 A. 719 (1930) ; Tranor's Est., 324 Pa. 263, 188 A. 292 (1936);
Orlady's Est., 336 Pa. 369, 9 A. 2d 539 (1939).
41 302 Pa. 78, 152 A. 840 (1930).
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in the meridian of his life. He was blind; not deaf, but hearing impaired;
his mind acted slowly; he was forgetful of recent events, 'especially of
names, and repeated questions in conversation; and sometimes, when
aroused from sleep or slumber, would seem bewildered. It is not singu-
lar that some of those who had known him when he was remarkable
for vigor and intelligence, are of opinion that his reason was so far gone
that he was incapable of making a will, although they never heard him
utter an irrational 'expression.' The will, in the instant case, may not be
just, but a person of disposing mind may make an unjust will. Morgan's
Estate, 219 Pa. 355, 68 A. 953; Cauffman v. Long, 82 Pa. 72; Guar-
antee T. & S. Dep. Co. v. Heidenreich, supra."
In Lawrence's Estate42 and Wertheimer's Estate43 are found two very inter-
esting cases on testamentary capacity and decided by our Supreme Court not quite
a month apart and both excellent opinions by Kephart, J. In the former the facts
involved the will of an aged man which had been refused probate by the register,
a caveat having been filed by his nieces and nephews. The orphans' court on ap-
peal refused to direct probate or to award an issue, and on appeal to the higher
court the decree was reversed and ordered that the will be admitted to probate. In
the latter case the will of the testatrix was admitted to probate and on appeal an
issue was refused, which action by the orphans' court was sustained by the higher
court. In this case the charge of incapacity rested on chronic alcoholic insanity from
1908 to the death of the testatrix in 1923. In both cases there was medical testi-
mony favoring testamentary incapacity, and in both cases the strongest evidence
as to capacity consisted of detailed statements of business as transacted at about
the time of the execution of the respective wills. In Wertheimer's Estate is found
this statement by tht learned justice which appears to be characteristic of so many
of the will cases. In referring to the evidence concerning the eccentricities in drink-
ing alcoholic liquors as indulged in by the testatrix, it was said:
"While all this is true, w cannot overlook our duty to safeguard
the integrity of wills, a policy for which this court is noted. We must
judge of the mental capacity as it is revealed by the evidence and ascertain
whether it was so reduced through indulgences, general or special, at the
time the will was executed, as to cause the act to be ineffective."
In Olshefski's Estate,44 another case where the alleged testamentary
incapacity of the testatrix was due to alcoholism, the will was admitted to probate
and upon appeal an award was made of an issue and the jury found that the
deceased lacked testamentary capacity and was unduly influenced. Whereupon the
proponent appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the judgment was
reversed with directions to the court below to certify this result to the orphans'
court. Lawrences' Estate46 and Wertheimer's Estate'6 are cited with approval and
42 286 Pa. 58, 132 A. 786 (1926).
48 286 Pa. 155, 133 A. 144 (1926).
44 337 Pa. 420, 11 A. 2d 487 (1940).
46 See n. 42, supra.
46 See n. 43, supra.
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again the medical testimony is discredited as will appear in the following excerpt
from the opinion of Drew, J., wherein after citing the above cases it is remarked:
"To rebut the presumption of sound and disposing memory, these
contestants and one doctor, a general practitioner, testified that deceased
had a weakened mind and was addicted to 'excessive use of alcohol. The
doctor testified that he had first treated testatrix three months prior to
the execution of the will for a hemorrhage following an automobile ac-
cident, in which she sustained a blow on the head. He stated that her
brain was atrophied, a condition which would become progressively
worse. He concluded that she must have been incapable of testamentary
dispositior on the day of the execution of the will. This witness admit-
tedly, however, had made no examination to determine her mental ca-
pacity and was extremely vague as to when he had last treated her, which
at best was a considerable time prior to the execution of the will. He
based his conclusions on what he thought her physical condition to be. He
did not relate any actual facts to substantiate his conclusions as to her men-
tal condition. Accordingly, his opinion was not grounded upon any defi-
nite or real knowledge of Mrs. Olshefski's testamentary capacity at the
time she executed her will. Such vague and inconsequential testimony is
of very little value as evidence."
In support, on the other hand, of the action of the court in reversing, the
Iearned justice thus observed:
"As against the testimony of contestants, the proponent introduced
evidence by the two subscribing witnesses who were in no way related to
testatrix and who had no interest under the will. They testified that at
the time of its execution testatrix was fully competent to dispose of her
worldly possessions. One of these witnesses was the scrivener, a justice
of the peace, and he testified that testatrix made a detailed recitation of
everything she owned and the disposition she desired to be made of it,
and that in doing so, she named each of her children individually and
determined just what each should receive. The evidence as to the clarity
of her mind was corroborated by the testimony of the other subscribing
witness. The overwhelming weight of the testimony favors the competency
of testatrix."
Knowledge of Property
Not only must the will maker have a 'full and intelligent consciousness of
the nature and effect of the act" at the time of execution but in addition it is stated
he must have "a full knowledge of the property he possessed". However, Wood-
ward, J., in Daniel v. Daniel47 in laying down the test does not use the adjective
"full" in describing knowledge, although he does use this word in describing
consciousness of the testator. He must have had a knowledge of the property he
possessed-an understanding of the disposition he wished to make of it by the
will, and of the persons and objects he desired to participate in his bounty. But
it is not necessary he should collect all of them in one review. If he understands in
detail all he is about, and chooses with understanding and reason between one
47 39 Pa. 191 (1861).
VOL. 58
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND RELATED MATTERS
disposition and another, it is sufficient. This is substantially followed in Thompson v.
Kyner48 and Wilson v. Mitchell49. Likewise in Tetlow's Estate5 o Moschzisker,
C.J., citing Thompson v. Kyner51 and Kustus v. Hager52 and referring to the testa-
tor on this very matter points out that if he appreciates, in a general way, who his
relations are and what property he possesses, and indicates an intelligent under-
standing of the disposition he desires to make of it, he has testamentary capacity."
These remarks are referred to with approval in Olshefski's Estate,58 citing
Tetlow's Estate,54 supra, and Phillips' Estate.55 On the other hand, the omission
by a testator from his will of important parts of his property might show a lack
of memory indicating testamentary incapacity as pointed out by Trunkey, J., in
Wilson v. Mitchell.56
Objects of Bounty
The will maker must have "an understanding of the disposition he wishes
to make... and of the persons and objects he desired to participate in his bounty."
In Chapter IV, ante, in discussing testamentary power, it was observed that a prop-
erty owner might dispose of his estate as he saw fit with the exception of the re-
strictions mentioned. Furthermore that some writers inclined to the inclusion of
the cases on soundness of mind in the same class with restrictions on testamentary
power. In reality the plenary power is so restricted in this type of cases where
courts and juries incline against a will of a testator who has failed to recognize his
moral obligations to those denominated the natural objects of his bounty. If, for
example, a father, in his will, should ignore a dutiful child of whom he had been
very fond, a plausible explanation would be lack of memory, which as intimated
by Trunkey, J., in Wilson v. Mitchell,5 7 although not total, yet extending to his
immediate family, might indicate testamentary incapacity. In Stevenson v. Steven-
son,58 Woodward, J., alludes to the old notion of a child being cut off with a shill-
ing thus anticipating a future effort to contest the will on grounds of lack of
memory and testamentary incapacity. In Crozer's Estate,5 9  Kephart, J.,
observed that a man's widow and children are the primary objects of his bounty.
On the contrary, Woodward, J., in Stevenson v. Stevenson60 caustically observed:
"A man without parents, wife, or children, can scarcely be said to
have natural objects of his bounty; and when he has been permitted to go
through life attending to his own affairs, and taking good care of his
48 65 Pa. 368 (1870).
49 101 Pa. 495 (1882).
50 269 Pa. 486, 112 A. 758 (1921).
51 See n. 48, supra.
52 269 Pa. 103, 112 A. 45 (1920).
53 See n. 44, supra.
54 See n. 50, supra.
56 299 Pa. 415, 149 A. 719 (1930).
56 See n. 49, supra.
57 Ibid.
58 33 Pa. 469 (1859).
59 336 Pa. 266, 9 A. 2d 535 (1939).
60 See n. 58, supra.
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estate, it is too late, after he has made his will and died, for collaterals
to discover that for six or eight years his mind had been under a cloud,
and that it passed into total eclipse just at the moment of their disappoint-
ment."
However, in Patti's Estate,61 Parker, J., of our Superior Court, in re-
versing the decree of the lower court refusing an issue on testamentary capacity
and undue influence, referred to a sister and brothers of the decedent, living in
Italy who had been recipients of his generosity as possible objects of bounty. The
inference was that the decedent would have considered them in any will to whicl
he subscribed and again that his interest in these relations continuing explained, in
part at least, his declination to sign a will, as was testified, which left them nothing.
It is obvious that the point about natural objects of one's bouny is relative and may
or may not be pressed, according to the particular facts. This observation, further-
more, should be remembered generally in will cases, for as Maxey, J., quoted in a
case on construction-"no will is brother to another." 62 On the question of mental
competency, in Griffin's Estate6" it was said that the will, having excluded
relatives should be strictly scrutinized and dear proof required of "sound mind
and disposing memory" with the free exercise of voluntary choice.
Insanity
Our cases, following the usual classification, distinguish between general
insanity which is mental incompetency complete-a permanent deficiency of men-
tal powers-and that which is partial-a specific and narrower form of insanity-
wherein there is deranged, erratic, distorted or delirious action evidenced by hal-
lucination or delusion. 64 In the words of Blackstone6" an idiot is "one that hath
had no understanding from his nativity, and, therefore is by law presumed never
likely to attain any"-an illustration of what is termed general insanity, that is a
permanent deficiency of mental powers. An imbecile, so called, and as found in
Daniel v. Daniel,66 is a type of this general insanity. Blackston'e6 7 also defines a
lunatic or one non compos mentis as "one who hath had understanding but, by
disease, grief, or other accident, hath lost the use of his reason. A lunatic is indeed
properly one that hath lucid intervals, sometimes enjoying his senses and sometimes
not, and that frequently depending upon the changes of the moon."
68
In modem psychiatry there are many terms to characterize the various types
of mental illness. As Lumpkin, J., observed in Slaughter v. Heath:69 "The mind
61 133 Pa. Super. 81, 1 A. 2d 791 (1938).
62 Joyce's Est., 273 Pa. 404, 117 A. 90 (1922) ; Knoll v. Hart, 308 Pa. 223, 162 A. 228 (1932).
68 109 Pa. Super. 594, 167 A. 613 (1933).
64 Taylor v. Trich, 165 Pa. 586 (1894); Rebby's Cases Law of Succession, p. 227 note (1930);
Rood on Wills (2d ed. 1926) p. 84.
65 2 BI. * 303.
66 See n. 47, supra.
67 2 Bl. * 304.
66 2 Bl. 271, Lewis' ed. (1898), where the editor characterizes the statement of Blackstone as
to the influence of the moon or moonlight upon the human mind "as one of the curious super-
stitions of the time."
69 127 Ga. 747, 57 S.E. 69 (1907); 27 L.R.A.N.S. 1.
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grades up from zero to the intellectual boiling point so gradually that dogmatic
tests are of little value."
From a testamentary standpoint the test has already been discussed and it is
obvious that one who is generally insane, that is, without lucid intervals, cannot
possess testamentary capacity. Yet the will of such a person if presented for pro-
bate with proofs of subscribing witnesses and with no caveat filed to warn the
register would probably, as a matter of routine, be admitted to probate. In the
cases, this has happened and upon appeal or issue granted, the insanity being
shown, the burden of proof in both senses 70 is imposed upon the proponent. How-
ever, where there has been no adjudication or inquisition and contestants set up
insanity, the affirmative is upon them. In Grubbs v. McDonald,71 Gordon, J., de-
clared:
"Testamentary capacity is the normal condition of one of full age,
and the affirmative is with him who undertakes to call it in question,
and this affirmative he must establish, not in a doubtful, but in a positive
manner."72
In Thompson v. Kyner,78 a case of senile dementia, mental weakness arising
from old age, the decay of the mental faculties following the loss of bodily vigor
and vitality, Thompson, J., said:
"Testamentary capacity is always presumed to exist until the con-
trary is established. An abnormal condition of mind is never presumed
when a testator makes his will, unless a previous aberration be shown,
of such a nature as may admit of a presumption of recurring unsound-
ness at any time."
Adjudication
In Harden v. Hays74 an action in ejectment was brought by a devisee under
an alleged will dated September 24, 1844, which had never been proved before
the register. At the trial plaintiff offered in evidence the will after proving the
handwriting of a deceased subscribing witness and by the oath of the surviving
subscribing witness to the signature of testator. The defendants then proved a
commission de lunatico inquirendo issued in December, 1844 with an inquest re-
turned finding John Hays, the testator, a lunatic for forty years past, with lucid
intervals. It was held that where there is uncontradicted evidence of general in-
sanity at a particular period, the onus of showing a lucid interval at the time of
the subsequent execution of a will lies on the party claiming under it. It is not
sufficient that there is evidence of sanity before and after the day on which the
will was made and the jury cannot be permitted from such evidence to infer that
a lucid interval intervened, during which the will was executed. In Titlow v. Tit-
70 (1) As establishing the issue, (2) Going forward with evidence to dislodge a prima facie case.
71 91 Pa. 236 (1879).
72 Olshefski's Est., 347 Pa. 420, 11 A. 2d 487 (1940), per Drew, J., citing Grubbs v. McDon-
ald and other cases, deducing from them the principle, "The contestants must adduce compelling
evidence to upset the will, since the law favors its validity."
78 65 Pa. 368 (1870).
74 9 Pa. 151 (1848).
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low,7 5 before the execution of th'e will, testator was found by inquisition to be a
lunatic with lucid intervals. In an issue to determine the validity of the will, it
was laid down that a finding of lunacy with lucid intervals casts the burden of
showing sanity on those sustaining the will, but such finding is prima facie evi-
dence only. In explaining these matters, Strong, J., said:
"The two remaining assignments of error may be considered to-
gether. The plaintiffs in error requested the court to charge the jury that
David Titlow is bound conclusively by the finding of the inquisition,
he having promoted it, submitted to it, and accepted the office of com-
mittee founded thereon, and also, that a lunatic has no power to pass
his estate in land immediately by conveyance or mediately by will; and
that after the lunacy has been established by inquisition a lucid interval
can avail nothing, unless the finding as to lunacy in general has been
avoided by due cours'e of law. These propositions the court refused to
affirm, and we think correctly. The general principle is, that an in-
quisition of lunacy found is prima facie evidence in cases involving the
sanity of the lunatic, and no more; such is the doctrine of our cases.
However, in Harden v. Hays,76 supra, Rogers, J., stated that under such cir-
cumstances, not only was the burden on the proponents to show that the will was
executed during a lucid interval but the evidence should be of the very time of
ex'ecution and of the most unexceptional kind and character.
In Hoope's Estate77 caveats were filed, a will was presented for probate
and a request made that the register appoint "an orphans' court for the decision
thereof agreeably to the 25th section of the Act of Assembly approved March 15,
1832, relating to registers, and registers' courts. ' '78 The register certified the record
over and at a hearing before the orphans' court proponents presented a prima
facie case by proving the execution of the alleged will by the subscribing witnesses,
testamentary capacity being presumed until disproved in accordance with Grubbs
v. McDonald.79 The caveators then presented a record showing that the testator
had, on May 2, 1887, been found "a lunatic and has been so for the space of six
years last past and does not enjoy lucid intervals." The will was dated June 28,
1892. The testimony showed the testator was over eighty years of age at the time
of signing the will; that his sister, several of his brothers and an aunt were insane,
and that he had been adjudged such; that his habits were filthy and he was in-
capable of taking proper care of his person; that he did not know who were his
relatives or next of kin; that he had no clear conception of his property or its value
and was under the delusion that his farm contained a large deposit of coal of
great value; he was easily influenced, especially by any one who favored the res-
toration of his property to his control and that he believed his committee, who
was not his next of kin and against whom he at times exhibited feelings of hos-
75 54 Pa. 216 (1867).
76 See n. 74, supra.
77 174 Pa. 373, 34 A. 603 (1896).
78 Act of March 15, 1832, P.L. 135; cf. Art. 5, sec. 22, Pa. Const., adopted in 1873 and sec. 17,
Register of Wills Act, Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 415, 20 P.S. 1841 et seq.
79 See n. 71, supra.
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tility, would secure a portion of his estate unless he made a will. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in a per curiam affirmed the lower court in refusing to grant an
issue, dismissing the appeal with the terse comment: "We are convinced that this
appeal is destitute of merit." In Brennan's Estate,80 likewise, the lower
court refused to grant an issue, this time on appeal from the register admitting to
probate the will of an aged maiden woman, who gave the residue of her estate
to the husband of her niece. A nephew being dissatisfied with the aunt's will chal-
lenged its validity on the grounds that it had been procured by undue influence
and testatrix lacked testamentary capacity. The decree of the lower court was
affirmed, Kephart, J., pointing out that although testatrix had two years before
the execution of the will been adjudged insane, nevertheless, insanity, with or
without adjudication, does not invalidate a will made during a lucid interval, ir-
respective of when made. In this case the proponents had the burden of showing
capacity at the time of making and executing the will and did so (1) by evidence
that testatrix had such capacity for a reasonable time before and after the time of
execution, and (2) by evidence of capacity at the time of making the will. The
court explained even though the disposition of the property may have been the
result of the likes and dislikes of the testatrix, nevertheless, as Paxson, J., declared
in Cauffman v. Long,81 "A man's prejudices are a part of his liberty," and con-
cerning the evidence of condition before and after the execution of the will, this
was proper for a reasonable period both ways as indicative of the condition on the
particular day, citing Aggas v. Munnell82 and Rubins v. -amnett.83 The court
discussed the evidence for and against the will and weighing the same most care-
fully came to the conclusion that the judge was correct in the result reached.
In Brennan's Estate84 the appeal was from a decree refusing an issue,
which was affirmed, thus sustaining the will and in Duncan's Will85 the
appeal was from a decree granting an issue wherein the jury found for the pro-
ponents, which was affirmed thus likewise sustaining the will. The testator exe-
cuted a holographic will on August 19, 1938 while an inmate of the Harrisburg
State Hospital for the Insane. In 1908 he had been judicially declared a lunatic
with lucid intervals and the following year was committed to this institution where
he remained until April 29, 1939, when he was paroled. He went to the home
of his sister where he died less than a month later, May 21, 1939. The bulk of the
estate amounting to about $13,500 was left to the children of testator's former
farmer. These persons had not seen testator after 1909 but he carried on some
correspondence with them while in the hospital. The sole surviving sister in whose
home he died was not mentioned in the will. A caveat was filed by a nephew and
SO 312 Pa. 335, 168 A. 25 (1933).
81 82 Pa. 72 (1876).
89 302 Pa. 78, 152 A. 840 (1930).
83 294 Pa. 295, 144 A. 72 (1928).
84 See n. 80, supra.
85 147 Pa. Super. 133, 23 A. 2d 357 (1941).
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the register certified the record to the orphans' court86 and after hearing, an issue
was awarded to try the question of testamentary capacity. The jury found that the
testator had testamentary capacity. Motions for judgment n.o.v. and a new trial
were overruled and an appeal was taken to the Superior Court. Baldridge, J., in
affirming the judgment of the court below reviewed the leading cases on testa-
mentary capacity, the burden of proof in adjudicated insanity and the nature of
the evidence to rebut the presumption of insanity. It does not follow necessarily
that one confined as insane is incapable of making a will. In Draper's
Estate87  and in Sterrett's Estate88 it was observed that the will might
have been made during a lucid interval, even when the insanity entirely clouds
the mind for the time and the testator is confined in an asylum, citing Titlow v.
Titlow.89 Furthermore, it was declared to be the policy of the courts to uphold the
right of testamentary disposition and protect the testator and "the legal objects
of his bounty," citing Central Trust Co., Ex'r. v. Boyer.90 Although the testator
had dementia praecox or schizophrenia of a paranoid type, his attending hospital
doctor testified that he had an intelligence quotient of 106, which was above nor-
mal; that he had a good memory, ability for ordinary business matters, under-
stood the value of money, had capacity of knowing the extent of his estate, who
his relatives were, and who the objects of his bounty should be; that he under-
stood thoroughly what he was doing when h'e wrote a will and knew the effect
of such. It was the witness' opinion that while his judgment was poor in some
instances, the testator had intellectual capacity to make a will. Against this testi-
mony, contestants presented that of a doctor, who testified as an expert but who
never knew the testator. In his judgment the testator had delusions and while pos-
sessed of knowledge, his intelligence was affected by a diseased mind, that "he
knew what he was doing" but his "intelligence was missing" and therefore he
did not have testamentary capacity. A substantial dispute having been raised it
was for the jury to determine whether or not the testator had testamentary capacity
as pointed out in Geist's Estate.91 Another interesting conclusion was the
court's opinion that there was nothing in this case to warrant the application of
the stringent rule of Harden v. Hays9 2 that the evidence of proponents must be of
a "most exceptional kind and character." It would appear, however, that the hos-
pital doctor's testimony did measure up to this requirement and in accordance with
the circumstances of the case as laid down in Hoopes' Estate.98
In Mohler's Estate94 there was an appeal from the decree of the court
below refusing to grant an issue and dismissing the appeal from probate. Testatrix
86 Sec. 19, Register of Wills Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 415, 20 P.S. 1982. For explanation of
procedure as compared with former Registers court, see Cross' Est., 278 Pa. 170, 122 A. 267 (1923).
87 215 Pa. 314, 64 A. 520 (1906).
88 300 Pa. 116, 150 A. 159 (1930).
89 See n. 75, supra.
90 308 Pa. 402, 162 A. 806 (1932).
91 325 Pa. 401, 191 A. 29 (1937).
92 See n. 74, supra.
93 See n. 77, supra.
94 343 Pa. 299, 22 A. 2d 680 (1941).
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left no children and appellant was a nephew who had been named as beneficiary
under a former will. The residuary legatee in the challenged will was the officer
of a trust company where the decedent had transacted business after the com-
pany had been made guardian for her as a weakminded person. She was under
care at a hospital for mental illness from January 7, 1939 to March 27, 1939. On
ihe latter date she was discharged but reported "for check-up and advice" to the
hospital doctor, the last visit to his office being October 31, 1939. The will was
dated August 7, 1939 and testatrix died November 28, 1939. The petition for
citation alleged lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence practiced by
the chief beneficiary. The facts were that testatrix wrote the will herself at the
trust company's office on the day of its execution and in the absence of the chief
beneficiary from the office and city. There was no evidence whatsoever of undue
influence. On the issue of testamentary capacity, the subscribing witnesses were
well acquainted with the testatrix and declared that she was at the timelcompetent
mentally and that she "knew exactly what she wanted him (the witness) to do,"
when she requested the will to be subscribed and that she had a knowledge of her
property. Maxey, J., rejected the point that it was contrary to public policy for a
fiduciary and confidential advisor to be chief beneficiary of the confider's will,
explaining that the law wisely casts upon such a legatee the burden of proving
that he used no undue influence to secure the legacy and this rule satisfies all the
applicable requirements of "public policy". The hospital doctor testified for conl-
testants but based his opinion of testatrix's lack of testamentary capacity on the
fact that she harbored unjust prejudices against others. In dismissing his testimony
as entitled to no weight the learned justice observed:
"The persuasive power of a conclusion is proportionate to the
cogency of th'e reasoning by which it is supported. An individual's "un-
just prejudices" against others, has no relation to his testamentary capacity
and an opinion based "principally" upon the converse assumption is en-
titled to little weight."
Attention was likewise called to the pronounced attitude of the courts in pro-
tecting the right of testamentary dispositions as declared so forcibly in Wetzel v
Edwards95 and Kustus v Hager.
96
Derangement
In Taylor v. Trich,9 7 writing a number of years ago, Williams, J., observed:
"There is no subject that has given rise to more extended discussion
in legal and medical circles than insanity. The tests by which its existence
and extent are to be determined; the stage of development at which moral
accountability ceases; the circumstances under which civil accountability
ought also to cease, and contracts to lose their legal value because of the
want of mental capacity on the part of him who enters into them to form
an intelligent judgment or give an intelligent assent, have been and still
96 340 Pa. 121, 16 A. 2d 441 (1941).
96 269 Pa. 103, 112 A. 45 (1920).
97 See n. 64, supra.
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are the subjects of earnest debate. The whole subject is, however, better
understood than formerly, notwithstandin, the want of entire harmony
in the conclusions that have been reached.
These observations, in a noted will case involving the intricate question
whether a testator was laboring under delusions, are just as apt today, although
there has been great advance in the matter of what is now called mental illness.
According to a noted psychiatrist, writing for popular reading,9 8 mental distor-
tions are, inter alia, perceptual, consisting of illusions, hallucinations and dis-
orientation. Or they may be intellectual, consisting of obsessions, memory distor-
tions, dissociations and d'elusions.
In Taylor v. Trich, supra, Williams, J., citing Tawney v. Long9 for the prin-
ciple that partial insanity is enough to defeat a will, which is the result of such
mental condition, further explained:
"By partial insanity is meant, not some intermediate stage in the de-
velopment of mental derangement, but disturbance at some particular
point not involving the mind at any other point. A p'erson thus affected
is said to be under the influence of a delusion."
A delusion rather loosely defined is a false impression or belief usually of a
fixed nature.
In the leading English case of Dew v. Clark,100 Sir John Nicholl declared:
"Whenever the patient once conceives something extravagant to
exist which still has no existence whatever but in his own heated imagi-
nation; and wherever, at the same time, having once so conceived, he is
incapable of being, or at least of being permanently, reasoned out of that
conception, such patient is said to be under a delusion in a peculiar, half
technical sense of the term; and the absence or presence of delusion, so
understood, forms, in my judgment, the true and only test of absent or
present insanity. In short, I look upon delusion in this sense of it, and
insanity, to b'e almost, if not altogether, convertible terms; so that a
patient, under a delusion, so understood, on any subject or subjects in any
degree, is for that reason essentially mad or insane on such subject or sub-
jects in that degree."
Rood in his work on wills' 01 makes the statement that deranged action of the
mind is discovered by observing the likes and dislikes, conduct, and beliefs of the
person" and further deduces that "the greater the degree of extravagance observed
in the likes and dislikes, conduct, and beliefs of the person, the stronger is their
tendency to produce a conviction that the person is not in his right mind; till
finally an extreme may be reached, as to any one of these or as all three combined,
which we cannot account for on any other hypothesis than that the person was not
in possession of his senses."
98 The Human Mind, by Karl A. Menninger (1930).
99 76 Pa. 106 (1874).
100 3 Addams Ecc. 79, 90.
101 Rood on Wills (2d ed. 1926) p. 84.
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In our cases the word delusion is used to express the mental states which
psychiatrists classify as delusions, hallucinations and illusions, the latter being
perceptual, the second being intellectual, and the first partaking of both. In Taw-
ney v. Long'0 2 testator evidently suffering from senile dementia was under the
delusion that his wife at the time eighty years of age was immoral and guilty of
meretricious relationship with their son-in-law, a false and fantastic belief, which
the lower court pronounced as "monstrous". In Hoope's Estate'03 a case of
general insanity, the testator was afflicted with several delusions, inter alia, that
his farm was underlaid with rich coal deposits-an instance of delusion of
grandeur-another that his guardian would get his estate unless he made a Will-
a sort of persecutional delusion. In Taylor v. Trich'04 the delusion was religious
and apparently of what has been called "the Jehovah complex". Another noted
case is Thomas v. Carter'0 5 where testator entertained against his own flesh and
blood a mono-maniacal delusion, conceiving his daughter to be immoral and al-
ways a bad character and his son-in-law as a knave. In affirming the judgment
of the lower court setting aside the will which disinherited the daughter, the fol-
lowing instruction to the jury was approved:
"If a monomaniacal delusion is unalterably entertained against a
wife or daughter, who otherwise would have been his legatee or devisee,
and who would seem to be the natural object of a man's regard when he
came to make a final disposition of his estate, and such delusion is shown
to have been the operating motive which excluded them; and if the sup-
posed act or misconduct, on the part of the wife or child, or both, had
no existence in fact, and was a creature of the diseased imagination of the
testator, and the will was engendered by this delusion and was its off-
spring, and made under its influence operating at the time and in the tes-
tamentary act; if, in short, the will was dictated by the delusion it cannot
be sustained as a last will and testament, because it is the production of a
mind incapable of correct reasoning as to the object of his bounty and the
character of his wife and children, and their relations toward himself."
As a guide in the matter of proper instruction to a jury in such a case, the
above quotation should prove valuable to those handling cases of a similar nature,
as it appears that the learn'ed judge has covered very accurately the various essential
points. In the four preceding cases' 06 just discussed, it will be observed that testa-
mentary power was denied either on the ground of general insanity, that is where
delusions were so varied as to becloud the mind of the testator completely, or that
the testator was at the time afflicted with such a delusion as direcly affected and
was connected with his exercise of testamentary disposition. It should be reason-
ably obvious however that whatever serious delusion had no connection with the
matter of testamentary disposition, however serious it might otherwise be, never-
theless the testamentary power would remain in force. A few cases will illustrate
102 See n. 99, supra.
103 See n. 77, supra.
104 See n. 64, supra.
105 170 Pa. 272, 33 A. 81 (1895).
106 Tawney v. Long; Hoope's Estate; Taylor v. Trich; Thomas v. Carter.
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this point. In Herr's Estate'0 7 the question was whether the lower court erred
in refusing an issue and dismissing the appeal from the decree of the register. The
testatrix was 83 years of age at the time of her death, leaving a will made nine
years prior, in which, after giving specific legacies to certain missionary and church
extension societies connected with the United Brethren in Christ, testatrix gave her
residuary estate amounting to about $130,000 to the Union Biblical Seminary of
the United Brethren in Christ, Dayton, Ohio. The will was contested by a half
sister who was the nearest relative of the decedent. In the opinion by Frazer, J.,
the evidence of testamentary capacity is reviewed at considerable length involving
the testimony of disinterested and substantial witn-esses who were present at the
time of the execution of the will which took place in the office of counpel for
the testatrix. On the other hand, the evidence of lack of testamentary capacity
consisted of testimony concerning "spells" to which the testatrix was subject and
also the fact that she was miserly and did not provide for herself sufficient food.
It was further contended that the will was induced by hallucinations or delusions
under which testatrix had been laboring for years, to the effect that her friends
and relatives, with particular reference to the contestant, were endeavoring to
rob her of her property. However, evidence was also adduced to show that there
was some justification for the fears entertained by the testatrix on account of litiga-
tion that had been conducted by the contestant. On these points the learned jus-
tice in affirming the decree of the court below observed:
"A delusion which will render invalid a will executed as the direct
result of it, is an insane belief or a mere figment of imagination, a belief
in the existence of something which does not exist, and which no rational
person would believe did exist: Taylor v. Trich, 165 Pa. 586; Alexander's
Est., 246 Pa. 58. The moment it is discovered however that what at first
sight was apparently a delusion is in fact based upon some substantial
ground, reasonably calculated to produce the belief held by testatrix, the
theory of the insane delusion necessarily disappears. One who is of sound
and disposing mind is entitled to distribute gis property as he may see
fit, without regard to the personal motives or prejudices which influenced
him: Dean v. Negley, 41 Pa. 312; Phillips' Est., 244 Pa. 35. His preju-
dices, likes or dislikes are his own as much as the property which he dis-
tributes, and the fact that his method of distribution may offend our
sense of propriety and justice is no reason to set aside the will: Cauff-
man v. Long, 82 Pa. 72; Phillips' Est., 244 Pa. 35-47."
Doster's Estate'0 8  presents another illustrative case, somewhat dra-
matic in background and details. There was an appeal from the register of wills,
the contestant claiming that decedent at the time he made his will was under the
insane delusion that she was not his daughter. The court dismissed the appeal and
iefused an issue. Whereupon the contestant appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court. The testator, General William E. Doster, was a man of high intellectual
attainment, a prominent lawyer for more than fifty years and a veteran of the
107 251 Pa. 223, 96 A. 464 (1915).
108 271 Pa. 68, 113 A. 831 (1921).
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Civil War, serving his country with distinction. He died at the age of 83, and up
to his last day had a large, varied and lucrative practice which required his constant
care and personal supervision. He is described as a man of strong mind and re-
markable physical vigor, personally supervising the management of his ten farms,
a banking institution, and looking after a large law practice. He was known to
have an arbitrary manner, a short curt military way of speaking and given at times
to anger and bitter recollections.
The contestant had been educated by the father who sent her to Europe at
the age of 12 years, and he had seen very little of her and had left her education
in the charge of strangers. The immediate facts involving the alleged delusion con-
sisted of a most unfortunate visit of the daughter and her family to the father on
July 17, 1918, uninvited, unannounced, as he was entertaining a guest in his home.
The conduct of the daughter was such as to outrage the father and on July 25, 1918,
at the age of 80 years, he wrote his will which became the present subject of con-
test. After the incident of July 17, 1918 General Doster referred to the contestant
as not being his daughter. The lower court construed this allusion not in the literal
sense as contestant did, but in rather a broad way as explaining the father's atti-
tude toward the daughter following the unfortunate incident already described.
All the evidence indicated that Gen'eral Doster at the time he wrote his will was
in possession of all his faculties and although he may have been unjust and un-
forgiving in his attitude toward his daughter, after July 17, 1918, nevertheless,
as remarked by Kephart, J., in affirming the decree of the lower court:
"If his treatment of his daughter is to be considered cruel the per-
son who must answer for it is the General. For, out of his large circle of
acquaintances in that community, not one of his business or professional
associates was called to testify to want of testamentary capacity."
InGuaranty Trust & Safe Deposit Company, Guardian, v. Heidenreich'09
there is a further illustration of the attitude of our courts in denying the effici-
ency of any delusions entertained by the testator but which are obviously foreign
to the matter of the will making. In this case the action of the lower court was set
aside in the granting of an issue and the judgment on the verdict was reversed
and the record remitted in order that the will might be duly probated. The testator
was a farmer 83 years of age at the time he executed his will under the supervision
of an attorney of good standing and after several conferences and considerable
discussion. The signature appeared in a clear strong hand and was witnessed by
two neighbors of the testator. There were other witnesses consisting of lawyers,
bankers, merchants, mechanics, collectors and others who had done business with
the testator and who gave evidence concerning his testamentary capacity at the
time. The son filed a caveat and the proceedings were certified by the register
to the orphans' court where later testimony was taken and an issue awarded re-
sulting in a verdict and judgment for the contestant. The Lvidence for the con-
testants was to the effect that the testator was "crazy", that he was afflicted with
109 290 Pa. 249, 138 A. 764 (1927).
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senile dementia, a progressive malady, and, while he might do some business,
was incapable of making a valid will, that he suffered from delusions concerning
religion and marriage. The appellate court inferred that the testimony might tend
to show that testator was a victim of erotomania, but that there was no evidence
connecting the delusions with the testamentary dispositions. It is also pointed out
that several months before the execution of the will in question the testator had
executed another will drawn by the lawyer who later represented the contestant in
the present proceedings, this former will having been attested by the particular
attorney and his wife, and that at the trial in the case now under consideration
n'either of these parties was asked concerning the testator's mental condition.
As to the irrelevancy of the evidence on delusions, Walling, J., declared:
"Considering and reconciling the evidence as best we may, it clearly
appears that testator's mind was sound as to matters of business, while a
finding that he had delusions as to religion and matrimony would be
warranted. Delusions, however, will not affect the validity of a will un-
less it is influenced thereby. 'A person whose mind is perverted by in-
sane delusions with reference to one or many subjects, however unrea-
sonable and absurd, may nevertheless make a valid will provided the pro-
visions of such will are not influenced by such delusions': Shreiner v.
Shreiner, 178 Pa. 57; see also Doster's Est., 271 Pa. 68; Englert v. Eng-
lert, 198 Pa. 326 Thomas, Exr. v. Carter, et al, 170 Pa. 272; Taylor, Exr.
v. Trich, et al., 165 Pa. 586; and Watmough's Est., 258 Pa. 22, 28. There
is no evidence that testator was under any delusion as to his property, or
kindred. Neither the clergymen, the church, nor the one he desired to
marry, ismentioned in the will; his entire estate being given to his chil-
dren and grandchildren, all of whom were named therein. Hence, as
the delusions were entirely aside therefrom they are unimportant."
In Alexander's Estate" o a daughter appealed from the decree of the
register admitting the will of her father to probate and in a petition to the orphans'
court praying for an issue averred that the will, so far as it affected her, was the
result of a delusion upon the part of the testator which rendered him insensible to
his parental obligations and to have caused him to execute the will admitted to
probate. The court refused to award the issue and on appeal its decree was af-
firmed. The father's attitude towards his daughter was explained by her "unnat-
ural conduct" in criticising the father's mode of life and also casting aspersions
upon the memory of her dead mother. The evidence disclosed that there were
many stories of her criticisms which were carried to the father and that they had
caus'ed him much distress of mind. In affirming the decree the following from the
lower court's opinion was approved, showing sufficient justification for the father's
will:
"Whether Mr. Alexander is to be condemned for listening to rumors
and idle gossip or, perhaps, to false stories told by persons to discredit
his own child, is not a question that this court is called upon to dcide.
The only inquiry is whether there is evidence from which a jury might
110 206 Pa. 47, 55 A. 797 (1903).
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reasonably infer that Mr. Alexander was laboring under a mental dis-
order; that the result of that inquiry is that there is nothing to show that
he did more than take the stories as they came to him, including the story
about his dead wife, believe them and pass a very severe judgment upon
the daughter."
In Watmough's Estate111  there was an appeal from the decree of
the register admitting a will to probate and a dismissal of the appeal by the orphans'
court, which refused to award an issue prayed for alleging testamentary incapacity,
where the only evidence. relied upon to establish the issue was that of a physician
who had attended the testator for a period of eight years prior to his death and
who testified that he observed no mental decline until on an occasion two and one-
half months before the execution of the will, when the deceased was in his 77th
year, he declared to the doctor that he was annoyed by red devils with forked tails
who had danced upon him during the night. The witness further stated that there
were days in the month preceding the execution of the will when the deceased
was entirely free from delusions and clear in mind and when he knew his rela-
tives and had an intelligent understanding of the value of his estate. For the pro-
ponents of the will two reputable attorneys, witnesses to the execution of the will,
testified that the testator was at the. time of the execution in full possession of his
faculties and had himself dictated the will and was fully informed with respect
to all that it contained.
Antipathies
Under the topic in the matter of testamentary dispositions are grouped a num-
ber of human emotions and mental states which have a powerful directive in-
fluence upon the individual guiding or driving him in the determination of the
disposition of his property. Keeping in mind the theory of testamentary power as
an exaltation of the individual's freedom of action-that he may do with his own
as he pleases, barring the restrictions already discussed, the advance is made to the
presumption of testamentary capacity-that every willmaker is presumed to have
a consciousness and full realization of the import of the testamentary act and the
burden is upon him who controverts this status, the conclusion is inevitable that
the motive for action is irrelevant. Sympathy or antipathy, likes or dislikes, love or
hatred, as the motive directing the gift are each and all wholly immaterial in the
view of the law. Long ago, Paxson, J., in Cauffman v. Long,112 quoted with ap-
proval the glib dictum of another, "A man's prejudices are a part of his liberty,"
a saying since quoted many times over. As recent as Mohler's Est." 3 Maxey,
J., observed:
"As to Mrs. Mohler's prejudices the court below appropriately said:
'She was indignant over the appointment of the guardian . . . How-
ever, she was entitled to her likes and dislikes, her preferences and preju-
dices, and even when overdrawn or in error this attitude does not justify
111 258 Pa. 22, 101 A. 857 (1917).
112 See n. 81, supra.
113 See n. 94, supra.
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the conclusions she was unable intelligently and capably to make her
will,"
In Mark's Estate" 4 likewise it was declared that antipathies against
relatives, standing alone, are no evidence of a disordered mind nor do they imply
an impaired mentality. In McGovran's Estate 15 the evidence showed mark-
ed hostility upon the part of the testatrix towards a niece attributing every atten-
tion received from that source to mercenary motives and believing not only that
she was scheming to get a portion of testatrix' estate but expressing fear the niece
might take her life the sooner to enjoy it. This case probably marks the verge of
the law, the court pointing out that if the evidence of such a condition of mind
and feeling upon the part of testatrix had been followed by other evidence showing
the same as based upon the supposed existence of facts which never existed and
which no rational person, in the absence of evidence, would have believed to
exist, this situation would be consistent with a theory of delusion. In Thomas v.
Carter 6 an -illustration is presented of antipathies and unfounded beliefs and
prejudices transcending from the innocuous to monomaniacal delusions affecting
fatally testamentary capacity. Thus in Matter of Mintzern 7 it was declared:
"If a testator entertains against his own flesh and blood some mono-
maniacal delusion, and because of the existence of this delusion, and
while laboring under its effects, he disinherits them, the act is evidently
one for which he would not be morally or legally responsible, it is the
act of a man laboring under a specific species of insanity, and the testator
is not and cannot be deemed to be a rational being-he is not a free
agent."
Beliefs and Opinions
Every individual is entitled to hold his own particular and peculiar beliefs and
opinions and the rule of law is that such beliefs and opinions, sound or erroneous,
do not necessarily" 8 militate against testamentary capacity. Judge King in Leech
v. Leech" 9 referring to witchcraft and other strange beliefs, observed:
"Eccentricities of conduct, absurd opinions, or belief, in things ap-
pearing to us extravagant, although they may be and are evidences of
testamentary incapacity, do not constitute it necessarily and in them-
selves."
If, however, such beliefs or opinions, religious or otherwise, unsound or ex-
travagant, become delusions, affecting directly the testamentary disposition, the
question of incapacity of the testator is presented. 120 Conversely, it has been held
114 298 Pa. 285, 148 A. 297 (1929).
115 185 Pa. 203, 39 A. 816 (1898).
116 See n. 105, supra.
117 5 Phila. 206 (1863).
118 Lawrence's Est., 286 Pa. 58, 132 A. 786 (1926), per Kephart, J., also Zaydon, James, "Eccen-
tricities and Testamentary Capacity", 46 Dick. L. Rev. 254.
119 1 Phila. 244, affirmed in 21 Pa. 67 (1853).
120 But delusions will not destroy testamentary capacity unless they dictate the will: Power v.
Overholt, 257 Pa. 254, 101 A. 733 (1917); Shreiner v. Shreiner, 178 Pa. 57, 35 A. 904 (1896);
Guaranty T. & S. Dept. Co. v. Heidenrich, 290 Pa. 249, 138 A. 764 (1927); 68 C.J. 432 § 29.
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that a mere belief in spiritualism is not, of itself, evidence of insanity and suffi-
cient to show the absence of testamentary capacity. But if a person has become a
monomaniac on the subject, incapable of reason where it is concerned, then a




From a study of the aforegoing cases the following propositions of law are
established.
(1) Every person of sound mind and of the age of twenty-one years or up-
wards, whether married or single, is competent to make a will disposing of his or
her property.
122
(2) During any war in which the United States is engaged a person of sound
mind 18 years of age or older and being in the armed forces of the United States
in active service at home or abroad, or being a mariner on land or at sea, may by
will dispose of all his real and personal estate subject to payment of debts and
charges and may thereafter revoke such a will whether or not the United States
is engaged in war and whether or not he is still in such service, or is a mariner.'2 s
(3) In cases of nuncupation the required age of the testator is 21 years or
upwards and under the Wills Act of 1947 there is no 'exception to this require-
ment.
124
(4) The courts have recognized in a long line of decisions "the unquestioned
right which every one master of himself has to give his property to whom lye
pleases", per Maxey, J., citing Kustus v. Hager2 5 as quoted in Mohler's Estate.
128
(5) No right of a citizen is more valued than the power to dispose of his
property by will and his last and final direction should not b'e struck down except
for the clearest reason.
121
(6) 'Where a paper in testamentary form is proved to be properly exe-
cuted there arise two presumptions, (a) that the willmaker was of testamentary
capacity and that the testamentary act was free from undue influence;128 and (b)
that the willmaker was at the time of the execution of the will "of the age of
twenty-one years or upwards."1
2 9
121 Matter of Mintzer, 5 Phila. 206 (1863) ; Ann. Cas. 1916 C 4.
122 Report of Joint State Government Commission, p. 34; Sec. 1(a) of Wills Act of 1947.
123 Report of Joint State Government Commission, p. 34; Sec. 1(b) of Wills Act of 1947.
124 Report of Joint State Government Commission, p. 37; Sec. 3 of Wills Act of 1947. Note com-
ment in Report of the Comm., p. 38, showing the changes in sec. 4 of the Wills Act of 1917; 20
P.S. 181 et seq.; See also cases in n. 6, supra.
128 269 Pa. 103, 112 A. 45 (1920).
126 See n. 113, supra.
127 Wetzel v. Edwards, 341 Pa. 121, 16 A. 2d 441 (1940).
128 Olshefski's Est., 347 Pa. 420, 11 A. 2d 487 (1940).
129 Stout v. Young, 217 Pa. 427, 66 A. 659 (1907).
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(7) To upset such a will the contestants must adduce compelling evidence,
since the law favors its validity, per Drew, J.130
(8) If the will is probated and no appeal is taken for two years, from the
decree of the register, the presumption as to full age becomes conclusive.' 8 '
(9) An adjudication of the insanity of the willmaker either shortly before
the execution of the will or shortly afterward, or any other evidence of insanity
at or about the time of execution of the will, offered by contestants will dislodge
the presumption of capacity and impose upon the proponents the burden of estab-
lishing the same by the preponderance of evidence.' 32
(10) A willmaker shown by the weight of evidence to have been generally
insane at the time of execution lacks testamentary capacity and the will is invalid.' 38
(11) A willmaker shown by the weight of evidence to be partially insane
may nevertheless have testamentary capacity if the weight of evidence shows a lucid
interval at the time of execution sufficient to measure up to the prescribed test.Ys"
(12) Old age, sickness, distress, debility of body, peculiar beliefs and opin-
ions, incapacity to do business, partial failure of memory neither prove nor raise
a presumption of incapacity. 135
(13) A delusion amounting to monomania and shown to be the immediate
cause of the testamentary disposition may render the will invalid although the
testator has general testamentary capacity.'
8 6
(14) Antipathies, dislikes and hatreds reflected in testamentary dispositions
are of themselves insufficient to render a will invalid unless they transcend to de-
lusions as heretofore stated.'1
7
(15) A potent and frequently controlling factor in will contests is the exer-
cise of the judicial function as developed in the evolution of the issue devisavit vel
non.
130 See n. 128, supra.
131 See n. 129, supra.
132 See n. 74-79, supra.
183 See n. 66-67, supra.
184 See n. 85, supra.
185 Per Kephart, J., Lawrence's Est., supra; see n. 45.
136 See n. 116, supra.
137 See n. 115, supra.
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